The EU-wide emissions trading scheme covering major CO 2 production sites will be enacted in 2005. Many design issues -most notably the initial allocation of allowances -are left to EU Member States. Under the EU emissions trading Directive Member States must draw up National Allocation Plans (NAPs) in which they (i) allocate the national emissions budget defined in the EU burden sharing agreement (EU BSA) to the different sectors of the economy and (ii) lay down the general rules that govern the initial emissions allocation to the firms eligible for emissions trading. This paper quantitatively analyzes aspects of efficiency and sectoral burden sharings that may result from different allocation rules.
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Introduction
In 2005, an EU-wide emissions trading scheme (EU (2003) ) that covers major CO 2 producing sites shall come into force. The key objective of the trading scheme is to promote costefficiency of carbon reduction under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement which prescribes specific commitments for the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions across EU Member States (EU (1999) ).
Prior to the enactment of the European trading scheme, each EU Member State must develop a National Allocation Plan that defines the overall cap on carbon emissions for installations included in the trading scheme as well as specifies the allocation rule for allowances.
Complementary domestic abatement policies must be undertaken in the sectors not covered by the emissions trading scheme in order to balance the countries' emission budgets as given by the EU Burden Sharing Agreement.
While aiming at cost-efficiency, each Member State has to account for two central constraints in the design of National Allocation Plans: (i) allocation of emission allowances to installations (sectors) covered by the trading scheme must be mainly for free 1 , and
(ii) competitive distortions involving different treatment of identical installations (firms or sectors) across EU countries should be avoided.
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Considering these as guidelines for the implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme, Böhringer and Lange (2004) have shown that it is generally impossible to preserve efficiency while requiring free allocation of emission allowances and non-discrimination of similar firms across countries. The intuition is straightforward: Overall efficiency implies equalized marginal abatement costs across all emitters within the EU.
1 Member States must allocate 95 % of emission allowances dedicated to the emissions trading sectors for free in the "warm-up" phase from 2005 to 2007. In the next phase -from 2008 to 2012 -this threshold can be reduced to 90 %, whereas the rules for later phases have been not yet decided upon. 2 The National Allocation Plans will be scrutinized by the EU Commission with respect to "common criteria" such as competitive distortions (Annex III, EU (2003) ).
Even if countries were fully identical, differences in exogenous emission reduction requirements -as prescribed by the EU Burden Sharing Agreement -imply that identical firms will face diverging specific allowance assignments, i.e. allocation factors. 3 When adopting harmonized rules for free allowance allocation, Böhringer and Lange (2004) point out two policy options in order to achieve identical allocation factors and, thus, avoid competitive distortions between identical firms within the EU emissions trading scheme:
Starting from a cost-efficient partitioning of the national emission budget between trading sectors (i.e. sectors covered by the EU emissions trading scheme) and the non-trading sectors (i.e. sectors outside the EU emissions trading scheme) of the economy, a national government may implement harmonized (exogenous) allocation factors by:
(i) either auctioning off or buying the remaining permits corresponding to the difference between the efficient amount of permit allowances for the trading sectors and the country's overall emission budget under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, or
(ii) re-adjusting the initial partitioning of the country's overall emission budget to meet the prescribed allocation factor.
The two options differ substantially with respect to their implications for overall efficiency and free allowance allocation, i.e. compensation to energy-intensive firms covered by the EU emissions trading scheme. The first option preserves efficient partitioning of national emission budgets but is in conflict with the requirement of free allowance allocation to trading sectors. The second option, in turn, maintains free allocation of emission allowances but involves potentially large efficiency losses as the re-partitioning of the country's emission budget implies differences between marginal abatement costs of the EU-wide trading scheme and the domestic marginal abatement costs in the non-trading segments of each EU Member State.
3 This paper complements basic economic reasoning with an interactive simulation model based on marginal abatement cost functions for sectors subject to emissions trading in the EU scheme (thereafter referred to as DIR sectors) and those sectors subject to complementary domestic emission regulation (thereafter referred to as NDIR sectors). The model is able to quantify the inherent trade-offs between efficiency, compensation, and competition neutrality for alternative designs of National Allocation Plans in EU Member States. The interested reader can access the model through a web-interface (http://brw.zew.de/simac/), specify abatement cost functions, set up National Allocation Plans, and calculate the associated economic implications.
An important feature of our interactive simulation model is the assessment of emission regulation costs not only at the level of EU Member States but also for trading energyintensive DIR sectors as well as non-trading NDIR sectors. In the policy debate on appropriate allocation factors for the DIR sectors, it is often overlooked that compensation to DIR sectors via generous allocation factors implies larger reduction requirements and hence higher economic costs for NDIR sectors given that both segments of the economy together are only endowed with the overall national emission budget under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement. Therefore, the design of National Allocation Plans does not only bear an efficiency dimension due to the hybrid regulation of DIR and NDIR sectors but also a potentially important equity dimension. In policy-relevant simulations, we find that National Allocation Plans warranting EU-wide uniform allocation factors of one (i.e. DIR sectors are allocated their business-as-usual emissions) induce total costs that are 10 times higher than the aggregate costs for an efficient trading scheme and 6 times higher than purely domestic abatement action (without international emissions trading). The associated cost for NDIR sectors increase substantially vis-à-vis the efficient regulation while the respective costs for DIR sectors fall to zero.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple analytical framework to demonstrate the trade-offs between efficiency, compensation and harmonization (competitive neutrality) inherent to the forthcoming implementation of the 4 hybrid EU regulation scheme. In section 3, we present a numerical framework based on marginal abatement cost curves to assess the economic implications of alternative National Allocation Plans. In section 4, we discuss the economic implications of illustrative policy scenarios. In section 5, we conclude. Instructions for the use of the interactive web-interface and the concrete algebraic model formulation (including the program code) are relegated to the Appendix.
Analytical Framework
We set up a simple stylized partial model to illustrate the implicit trade-offs between three central policy objectives underlying the forthcoming implementation of an EU-wide emissions trading scheme: efficiency, compensation, and harmonization.
We consider R regions (r=1,...,R Figure 1 illustrates the case where domestic abatement costs to reach the domestic target r E are below the international emission price; hence, the region becomes an exporter of emission allowances. From the perspective of an (EU-) social planner, the efficient solution could be decentralized by imposing uniform emission taxes at the optimal rate σ on the NDIR sectors. 
Compensation
Compensation to DIR sectors has been a conditio-sine-qua-non for the legal approval of the trading initiative by the EU Parliament. In this vein, implementation of the EU trading scheme via National Allocation Plans prescribes free allocation of emission allowances to DIR sectors. As to allocation rules, two approaches are prominently discussed: Emission allocation should be based on output levels (benchmarking) or on historic emissions (grandfathering). Applied to historic data, these rules boil down to lump-sum transfers to firms in the DIR sectors. 5 Reflecting current policy proposals, we assume that firms in the DIR sectors receive an initial allocation of allowances based on some historic emission level 0 ,DIR r e . The total allocation of allowances to DIR sectors in region r, i.e. 
Numerical Framework
In order to quantify the policy relevance of the trade-offs between efficiency, compensation, and harmonization, we transform the stylized analytical framework of section 2 into a simple numerical model based on marginal abatement cost curves for DIR and NDIR sectors in the EU-15. They are calibrated to empirical data.
Model Parameterization
Marginal costs of emission abatement may vary considerably across countries and sectors due to differences in carbon intensity, initial energy price levels, or the ease of carbon substitution possibilities. Continuous marginal abatement cost curves for the DIR and NDIR sectors in EU countries can be derived from a sufficiently large number of discrete observations for marginal abatement costs and the associated emission reductions in the DIR and NDIR sectors. In applied research these values are often generated by partial equilibrium models of the energy system (such as the POLES model by Criqui and Mima (2001) or the PRIMES model by Capros et al. (1998) ), that embody a detailed bottom-up description of technological options. Another possibility is to derive marginal abatement cost curves from computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (see e.g. Reilly et al.(1999) or Eyckmans et al. (2001) ). We adopt the latter approach and generate a reduced form of complex CGE interactions in terms of marginal abatement cost curves that are directly accessible to the non-CGE specialist. In order to obtain such marginal abatement cost curves for the DIR and NDIR sectors across EU countries, we make use of a standard static multi-region, multi-sector CGE model for the EU economy (see Böhringer (2002) for a detailed algebraic exposition) based on the most recent consistent accounts of EU Member States' production and consumption, 8 bilateral trade and energy flows for 1997 (as provided by the GTAP5-E database -see Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) ). With respect to the analysis of carbon abatement policies, the sectors in the model have been carefully selected to keep the most carbonintensive sectors in the available data as separate as possible. The energy goods identified in the model include primary carriers (coal, natural gas, crude oil) and secondary energy carriers (refined oil products and electricity). Furthermore, the model features three additional energyintensive non-energy sectors (iron and steel; paper, pulp and printing; non-ferrous metals) whose installations -in addition to the secondary energy branches (refined oil products and electricity) -are subject to the EU emissions trading system. The remaining manufacturers and services are aggregated to a composite industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good, which together with final demand captures the activities (NDIR segments) that are not included in the EU trading system. To generate our reduced form model, we perform a sequence of carbon tax scenarios for each region where we impose uniform carbon taxes (starting from 0 € to 200 € per ton of carbon in iso-distant steps of 1 €). We thereby generate a large number of marginal abatement costs, i.e. carbon taxes, and the associated emission reductions in DIR and NDIR sectors. The final step involves a fit to the set of "observations". Various types of functional forms could be employed. Common forms include iso-elastic exponential functions (of the type Reilly et al. (1999) or Böhringer and Löschel (2003) ). 6 For our numerical framework, we apply a least-square fit by a polynomial of third degree which provides sufficient flexibility. Table 1 lists the associated least-square estimates for the coefficients of marginal abatement cost curves across regions. Costs are measured in 1997 dollars per ton of carbon, while the quantities are measured in million tons of carbon. Obviously, simulation results are sensitive to both the quality of the fit as well as the accuracy of the underlying "observations". In our case, marginal abatement cost functions capture the economic costs of reducing carbon at a historical point in time, i.e. 1997. If regulation applies to future periods, the prospective adjustment costs must be measured against the projected business-as-usual. The concrete assessment of future marginal and inframarginal abatement costs then hinges on baseline projections for the economy which -given the uncertainty about the future -is a challenge for quantitative analysis and demands for comprehensive sensitivity analysis. In our context, Table 2 illustrates the impact of the base-year choice on the magnitude of effective emission reduction requirements which are a key driver of marginal and inframarginal costs. Spain, in turn, had been attributed an emission budget of 15 % in excess of its 1990 emissions but due to economic growth faces an effective reduction of 6 % in 1997 which rises up to 14 % vis-à-vis projected business-as-usual emission levels in 2010.
For reasons of uncertainties and potentially large inconsistencies associated with business-asusual projections, we base our simulation analysis on historical data for 1997 -the most recent year for which a consistent economic data set at the EU level is available.
Acknowledging the importance of the reference period, however, our web-based interface accommodates the flexible parameterization of marginal abatement cost functions and associated base-year-emissions.
Partial versus General Equilibrium Analysis
The reduced form representation of economy-wide adjustment to emission regulation provides a transparent and easy access to numerical analysis. A potential drawback of such a simplifying approach is the neglect of market interaction and spillover effects. There are several articles illustrating the importance of such indirect effects (Böhringer (2002) , Böhringer and Rutherford (2002) , Bernard et al. (2003) , Klepper and Peterson (2002) ). In the context of carbon abatement policies, induced terms-of-trade effects on fossil fuel markets may substantially alter the direct costs of abatement. Depending on the magnitude of global cuts in fossil fuel demand and the level of fossil fuel supply elasticities, a drop in international fuel prices provides secondary benefits for fossil fuel importers while it hurts fossil fuel exporters. Adjustment costs in one country thus generally depend on how much other countries reduce their emissions.
Against this background, the crucial question regarding the robustness of partial equilibrium results based on marginal abatement cost curves is whether terms-of-trade effects are sufficiently small. For our policy issue, the omission of terms-of-trade effects is in place: On the one hand, when determining the impact of different National Allocation Plans, policies outside the EU can be taken as exogenous. On the other hand, changes in the allocation rules in EU countries do not affect the overall European reduction target, which after all has a 12 negligible impact on world prices as EU emission cutback under the Burden Sharing Agreement amounts only to a very small share in global carbon emissions.
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Apart from terms-of-trade effects, other potentially important general equilibrium interactions concern revenue-recycling. It is well-known that the manner in which revenues from environmental regulation are recycled to the economy can have a larger impact on the gross costs of environmental policy (see Goulder (1995) or Bovenberg (1999) 
Scenarios
The primary objective of emissions trading is to achieve potential efficiency gains. So-called "where-flexibility" assures that emissions will be abated where it is cheapest across all emitting sources. Full "where-flexibility" implies flexibility across countries -say regional flexibility -and flexibility across the sectors of the economy -say sectoral flexibility. It is the nature of a hybrid emissions trading regime such as the EU scheme for carbon dioxide that sectoral flexibility is restricted in the sense that not all sectors are eligible for trading.
We illustrate the policy relevance of trade-offs between efficiency, compensation and harmonization in implementing National Allocation Plans along three stylized policy scenarios:
The NoTrade scenario delivers a benchmark for the magnitude and distribution of efficiency gains emerging from cross-country flexibility of emission abatement within the EU. Under NoTrade, EU Member States meet the emission reduction 8 The cutback in emissions under the Burden Sharing Agreement amounts to 1.7% of global carbon use in 1997 and 1% of projected global carbon use in 2010 with negligible impacts on international fossil fuel prices. 9 A crude shortcut to an explicit representation of tax interaction effects is the use of estimates for marginal costs of public funds that may be applied ex-post to assess the "double dividend" of recycling revenues for cuts in distortionary taxes (see e.g. Böhringer and Rutherford (2002) (iii) NAP_Unity: This scenario accounts for two central elements in the policy debate on the implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme. Firstly, there is the concern regarding competitive distortions due to non-uniform allocation factors across EU countries.
Secondly, there are fears that energy-intensive industries in most EU countries will be forced to decrease their production levels as a consequence of binding emission constraints. In our static framework, preserving competition neutrality through uniform allocation factors and warranting business-as-usual production comes down to an allocation factor of unity. The settings for the NAP_Unity scenario reflect these policy considerations by adopting a harmonized allocation factor of 1 = λ (under emissions-based allowance assignment) for all regions. In order to achieve the harmonized allocation factor of unity, the optimal partitioning 14 of the national emission budget (as determined by scenario NAP_Opt) will be abandoned and marginal abatement costs between DIR and NDIR sectors will fall apart inducing an efficiency trade-off due to harmonization. In the NAP_Opt scenario sectoral flexibility between DIR and NDIR sectors is restricted but there is full regional flexibility within the DIR sectors of the regions.
Free emission allocation to DIR sectors is based on historic emissions of these sectors for the base-year 1997. Table 3 provides a summary of the central policy settings across the four scenarios. Table 4 reports quantitative results for our scenarios on marginal abatement costs as well as total abatement costs differentiated in both DIR and NDIR sectors. Under NoTrade, the marginal abatement costs are equivalent to the domestic carbon tax which EU Member States must levy to achieve their respective emission reduction target under the Burden Sharing Agreement. A key determinant for the magnitude of marginal abatement costs is the effective cutback requirement. Ceteris paribus, the more emissions a country has to reduce, the more costly it is at the margin to substitute away from carbon in production and consumption. and abate more emissions. In turn, countries whose marginal abatement costs are above the uniform permit price will buy permits and abate less.
Imposition of uniform allocation factors that grant DIR sectors their BAU emission levels, i.e. 1 = r λ , imply an effective reduction requirement of zero for these segments given that the base-year for emission allocation coincides with the target year for abatement compliance. 10 10 Clearly, this is a rather extreme setting but it serves the purpose to illustrate the implications of generous allowance allocation to DIR sectors that appears as a common feature in the concrete specification design of National Allocation Plans across EU Member States.
All the abatement is shifted to NDIR sectors which are excluded from international emissions trading. The hybrid regulation then leads to extremely high marginal abatement costs in the NDIR sectors of several EU Member States.
The differences in marginal abatement costs across scenarios are reflected in the differences of aggregate EU abatement costs under the Burden Sharing Agreement. Total compliance costs amount to nearly 2 billion € for the NoTrade case. These costs can be substantially reduced via implementation of an efficient EU emissions trading scheme. In our case, the cost savings equal more than a third of the NoTrade compliance costs. All countries are better off under efficient trading as compared to purely domestic action. In our partial equilibrium framework -where we neglect terms-of-trade and income effects -this result does not come as a surprise: Comprehensive "where-flexibility" must be pareto-superior.
Ceteris paribus a country's gains from unconstrained "where-flexibility" rise with an increased deviation of its autarky marginal abatement costs from the efficient international permit price. For example, the efficiency gains under NAP_Opt for Germany compared to the NoTrade case are very small (ca. 0.2 %) since Germany's autarky carbon value is very close to the international permit price. In contrast, Austria gains more than 60 % from efficient trading as its NoTrade marginal abatement costs are six times the international permit price.
Countries which do not face a binding emission constraint under NoTrade unambiguously will have negative costs under NAP_Opt, i.e. they will be better off with EU regulation than without because their revenues from permit sales exceed the domestic abatement costs (here:
Greece and Portugal). Likewise countries with relatively low abatement targets may more than offset overall abatement costs with revenues from permit sales (here: France and Sweden).
As soon as we restrict "where-flexibility" at the sectoral level and do not depict the efficient partitioning of national budgets, efficiency implications of carbon trade may be quite different. It is no longer clear that the EU as a whole nor individual Member States will 18 benefit vis-à-vis domestic abatement policies (e.g. carbon taxes where part of tax revenues may be recycled lump-sum to energy-intensive industries for compensation purposes).
Scenario NAP_Unity provides evidence on the potential magnitude of efficiency losses through hybrid regulation: Under NAP_Unity aggregate costs are 10 times higher than under an efficient trading scheme and 6 times higher than for purely domestic abatement action. In this case, there are no efficiency gains that could be exploited in DIR sectors through regional flexibility because the implied carbon price is zero. All abatement is shifted to the NDIR sectors and must be achieved by domestic policies. Countries, thus, can not take advantage of sectoral flexibility ending up with higher marginal abatement costs for the DIR sectors compared to the NoTrade scenario and zero marginal costs for the NDIR sectors. (2001), p. 78) but in general this is at the expense of environmental effectiveness rather than more stringent regulation for other sectors. In the case of the hybrid EU trading scheme, however, the situation is different as the environmental target is fixed. Table 5 shows the large differences in endogenous allocation factors for the efficient NAP_Opt scenario.
They range from 0.34 for Denmark up to 1.18 for Greece and provide clear evidence that concerns about competitive distortions between identical firms within the EU can be justified (when keeping with the objectives of overall efficiency and free allowance allocation). The cross-country differences in allocation factors reflect country-and sector-specific differences in the relative ease of carbon mitigation as captured by the curvature of calibrated marginal abatement cost curves.
Finally, we turn to the induced percentage emission reductions at the regional and sectoral level that are reported in Table 5 . By definition, the aggregate region's emission reduction must comply with the EU Burden Sharing Agreement for the NoTrade scenario. Within regions, the DIR sectors will contribute relatively more to the reduction requirement which means that carbon abatement options in energy-intensive industries through fuel shifting or energy savings is relatively cheaper than in the NDIR sectors. 13 For efficient carbon trading the direction and magnitude of changes in autarky emission reductions are driven by the differences between the autarky carbon value and the international permit price (the qualitative movements for DIR and NDIR sectors within a single region are the same). Under NAP_Unity, total emission reduction at the regional level will be the same as under NoTrade because regional flexibility across DIR sectors hasn't any effect. The implied shifts at the sectoral level are, however, dramatic: Under NAP_Unity the NDIR sectors have to deliver the overall regional abatement duties implying very high NDIR percentage reduction for several EU countries. 14 Furthermore, the inherent conflict between compensation and harmonization could be resolved by a gradual transition to an auctioned permit system. The latter simply implies the rigorous adoption of the "polluter pays principle" which -in terms of efficient resource use -should be the guiding principle of any market-based environmental policy.
Finally, it should be stressed that our analysis is of interest beyond the scope of the current debate on National Allocation Plans. The derived insights may not be only useful for the redesign of Allocation Plans across EU Member States in future periods, but also with respect to 14 Carbon emissions could be easily controlled upstream via a rather limited number of fuel retailers.
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the specification of any hybrid regulation regime where emissions trading for some sectors is combined with complementary regulation in other sectors.
Appendix: Analytical Framework
A.1 Algebraic Model Summary
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for a simple partial equilibrium model designed to investigate the economic implications of emission allocation and emissions trading in a multi-sector, multi-region framework. Emission mitigation options are captured through marginal abatement cost curves that are differentiated by sectors and regions.
Cast as a planning problem, our model corresponds to a nonlinear program that seeks a costminimizing abatement scheme subject to initial emission allocation and institutional restrictions for emissions trading between sectors and regions. The nonlinear optimization problem can be interpreted as a market equilibrium problem where prices and quantities are defined using duality theory. In this case, a system of (weak) inequalities and complementary slackness conditions replace the minimization operator yielding a so-called mixed complementarity problem (see e.g. Rutherford (1995) ).
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Two classes of conditions characterize the (competitive) equilibrium for our model: zero profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity levels (quantities) and the latter determines prices. The economic equilibrium features complementarity between equilibrium variables and equilibrium conditions: activities will be operated as long as they break even, positive market prices imply market clearance -otherwise commodities are in excess supply and the respective prices fall to zero.
The MCP formulation provides a general format for economic equilibrium problems that may not be easily studied in an optimization context. Only if the complementarity problem is "integrable" (see Takayma and Judge (1971) ), the solution corresponds to the first-order conditions for a (primal or dual) programming problem. Taxes, income effects, spillovers and other externalities, however, interfere with the skew symmetry property which characterizes first order conditions for nonlinear programs. 16 In this context, the term "mixed complementarity problem" (MCP) is straightforward: "mixed" indicates that the mathematical formulation is based on weak inequalities that may include a mixture of equalities and inequalities; "complementarity" refers to complementary slackness between system variables and system conditions.
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In our algebraic exposition of equilibrium conditions, we use i as an index for sectors and r as an index for regions. 17 Table A .1 explains the notations for variables and parameters. 17 The variable associated with each equilibrium condition is added in brackets and denoted with an orthogonality symbol ( ⊥ ). 
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A.2 GAMS Code
Numerically, the algebraic MCP formulation of our model is implemented in GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus (1987) ) using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris (1995) cutback(r,"1990") = eu_bsa(r); cutback("EUR","1990") = ROUND(100*sum(r,(cutback(r,"1990")/100)* carbonstat(r,"C_90_Total")) /sum(r, carbonstat(r,"C_90_Total")), 1); cutback(r,"1997") = ROUND(100*(1 -( (1-cutback(r,"1990")/100)*carbonstat(r,"C_90_Total")) /carbonstat(r,"C_97_Total")),1); cutback("EUR","1997") = ROUND(100*sum(r,(cutback(r,"1997")/100)* carbonstat(r,"C_97_Total")) /sum(r, carbonstat(r,"C_97_Total")), 1); We therefore do an initial solve for comprehensive trading to determine the optimal allocation factor. x.UP(i,re) = +INF; m.UP(i,re) = +INF; pfx.UP = +INF; SOLVE simac using mcp; lambda(re,"NAP_Opt") = (carbonstat(re,"C_90_Total")*(1-cutback(re,"1990")/100) -(carbonstat(re,"C_97_NDIR")-d.l("NDIR",re))) / carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR"); IF(nap_opt(sc), * Efficient implementation of hybrid NAP system target("DIR",re) = carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR") -lambda(re,"NAP_Opt") * carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR"); target("NDIR",re) = carbonstat(re,"C_97_NDIR") -(carbonstat(re,"C_90_Total")*(1-cutback(re,"1990")/100) -lambda(re,"NAP_Opt") *carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR")); x.FX("NDIR",re) = 0; m.FX("NDIR",re) = 0; pfx.UP = +INF; xd.FX("DIR",re) = 0; md.FX("DIR",re) = 0; ); IF(nap_unity(sc), * Implementation of hybrid NAP system with emission based allocation factor of unity (base year: 1997) target("DIR",re) = carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR") -1* carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR"); target("NDIR",re) = carbonstat(re,"C_97_NDIR") -(carbonstat(re,"C_90_Total")*(1-cutback(re,"1990")/100) -1*carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR")); reduction(re,"DIR",sc) = ROUND(100* d.l("DIR",re)/carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR"), 1); reduction(re,"NDIR",sc) = ROUND(100* d.l("NDIR",re)/carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR"), 1); reduction(re,"TOTAL",sc) = ROUND(100* sum(i,d.l(i,re))/carbonstat(re,"C_97_TOTAL"), 1); lambda(re,sc)$naps(sc) = 1$(not d.l("NDIR",re)) + [(carbonstat(re,"C_90_Total")*(1-cutback(re,"1990")/100) -(carbonstat(re,"C_97_NDIR")-d.l("NDIR",re))) / carbonstat(re,"C_97_DIR")]$(d.l("NDIR",re)) ; Table 2 of paper "CO2 emissions and reduction requirements", table_4 Table 4 of paper "Marginal abatement costs and total compliance costs" table_5 Table 5 of paper "Allocation factors and emission reduction"; * Generate Table 2 of paper table_2 (re, "1990_a") = ROUND(44/12*carbonstat(re, "C_90_Total"),1); table_2 ("EUR","1990_a") = sum(re,table_2(re,"1990_a")); table_2 (re, "1997_a") = ROUND(44/12*carbonstat(re, "C_97_Total"),1); table_2 ("EUR","1997_a") = sum(re,table_2(re,"1997_a"));
